[Originally published in Turkish Daily News]
The most well kept spot in the northern Iraqi city of Arbil is probably “Freedom Park,” which looks like a green oasis amid the otherwise dusty and rusty streets.
Freedom Park is home to a sizeable pool, a play garden, and, most important of all, the “Freedom Monument” which praises the memory of “98 patriots who gave their lives for the freedom of Kurdistan.” These “martyrs” were members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani respectively. They all died on Feb. 1, 2004, when two suicide bombers joined the religious feast celebrations in the parties’ headquarters, and, as their definition implies, blew themselves up together with dozens of others around.
It was a horrible day for Iraqi Kurds, to be sure. But it was also a landmark moment – such as, say, the Battle of the Alamo – that made the Kurds feel that they are really a nation and that they should stand united against their common enemies.
Freedom Park is not the only sign of the rapid nation-building process underway in The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq (KRG), which was formed as early as 1992 and gained constitutional status with the Iraqi elections on Jan. 30, 2005. The autonomous region, which is also referred to as Iraqi Kurdistan, or simply Kurdistan, consists of three districts: Dohuk, Arbil and Suleymaniya. The population in these governorates is predominantly Kurdish, but include other groups as well, such as the Turkmens and the Christian Assyrians. Kurdistanis are also very much hoping to incorporate the oil-rich Kirkuk into their territory, but that’s a very controversial – and potentially conflictive – aspiration.
Flags and Heroes
This new little country Kurdistan is actually a part of Iraq, but there is hardly any visible evidence to prove that link. Neither the capital Arbil nor Salahaddin, the small nearby resort-like town, which hosts the residences of some top-level KDP officials, bear Iraqi flags. The only flag that flies in the skies of Kurdistan is the Kurdish one with its red, white and green stripes and bright yellow sun. The walls of not only official buildings but also virtually all restaurants and hotels are full of the portraits of national heroes: “Mullah” Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979), the godfather of Iraq’s Kurdish movement, his son and Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, and Iraq’s first Kurdish President, Jalal Talabani. The thick and high wall surrounding the parliament – also a fortified barrier against possible terror attacks – is covered with paintings of glorious Kurds defying bombs by waving flags.
It is not an accident that Arabs in Iraq are defined according to their religious affiliation — they are Shiites, Sunnis, or even Christians — whereas Kurds are simply Kurds, whatever their creed may be. Arabs, who have long been recognized as a people and who have many nation states, are not so emphatic about their ethnic identity. Kurds, on the other hand, have never had a state of their own — at least in modern history. They are latecomers to history. And they are excited about their arrival.
The Peace to End All Peace
The whole story goes back to World War I, which ended with “the peace to end all peace,” as historian David Fromkin called it. Before that, much of the modern Middle East was run by the Ottoman Empire. All Kurds, along with Turks and many Arabs, were citizens — or subjects — of the multi-ethnic empire. The so-called Great War ended the Ottoman state, and many nation states emerged from its ashes. Nations such as Turks, Albanians or Arabs, who had started to build their national identity well before the empire’s end, managed to form their nation-states. (The Arabs quite a lot.)
But Kurds, probably the least modernized among the peoples of the Empire, mainly due to their isolated geography, did not pursue a nationalist cause. A handful of Kurdish intellectuals, who did indeed try to create an independent Kurdistan with the support of the Allies, failed. Nobody turned out to be too enthusiastic about creating a Kurdish state, including most of the Kurds themselves. The majority of Turkey’s Kurds chose to remain loyal to the newly emerging Turkish Republic, which they perceived as the continuation of the Ottoman state that they had been happy to be a part of.
But Republican Turkey would not be as tolerant toward Kurds as the Ottomans were. Soon “Turkishness” became the only accepted identity and many Kurds felt suppressed and denied. Hence came successive Kurdish revolts. Moreover, as Kurds modernized, they too started to inhale modern ideas of nationalism. That is why Turkey’s most powerful and radical Kurdish nationalist organization, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), was formed not by tribal leaders of the rural southeast, but left-wing Kurdish students who were studying political science in Ankara.
Problems With Catching Up
The more Kurds modernize, the more they surpass traditional identities of tribe and religion, and become open to nationalism. This is a process that European nations passed through in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Turks in the 20th, and now Kurds are trying to catch up. Yet they are doing this at an epoch in human history in which nation states are already on the decline and supra-national identities and organizations are being enhanced by constant globalization. Will this belatedness make Kurdish identity more radical or more moderate?
Both trends are possible and actually in co-existence. The newly emerging Kurdish nationalism has radical and violent offshoots, such as the PKK. There are also more reasonable versions, such as the Kurdish movements and intellectuals who denounce violence and emphasize democracy, freedom and human rights. The leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan use the latter rhetoric, which sounds constructive, but some facts on the ground point to a less pleasant picture. There is apparently a sort of tribalism in more modern forms — such as the system of patronage created under the KDP. Barzani’s party dominates every scene and people complain about failing to get contracts or work permits unless they “cooperate” with KDP officials. There is a convergence with the ruling party and the state – and this is not good news for democracy.
That might refer to the usual problems in developing countries, but Kurdistan has additional ones, such as dreams of pan-Kurdism, which ring alarm bells in the region.
Turkish Concerns and The PKK
Many Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan are optimistic about the future of their country. At present it is only an autonomous region within Iraq and they say they want to keep it that way for the foreseeable future. But many don’t hide the fact that their ultimate goal would be the creation of an independent state. Plus, they believe in the existence of a greater Kurdish nation, which surpasses their borders and extends into at least three of the neighboring countries, namely Turkey, Iran and Syria.
No wonder these countries have deep concerns about all this. Turkey, home to the largest populace of Kurdish origins on Earth, has been especially anxious about the creation of a Kurdistan in Iraq, fearing a domino effect on the northern side of the border.
Turkey has already been uneasy about its “Kurdish reality,” which it denied for many decades. The current government, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), hopes to solve the problem by giving more rights and freedoms to Kurds and through integrating them further into the Turkish economy. This idea indeed appeals to many Kurds and that’s why the AKP gained an astonishing 55 percent of votes in southeastern Turkey in the general elections of July 22, 2007. But the PKK’s base also continues to exist, and the 24 percent of the southeastern vote that the “Independent” Kurdish candidates won in the same elections is seen as corresponding to that.
Recently the PKK fighters have found safe havens for themselves in the steep mountains of northern Iraq, from which they launched terrorist attacks against Turkish targets. This led Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan into a clash of words. Ankara accused Arbil for sponsoring terrorism, whereas the latter accused the former of using the PKK as a pretext for threatening their autonomous region. Hawks in Turkey called for immediate sanctions and even a military strike on Iraqi Kurdistan, whereas Erdoğan preferred the way of diplomacy. During his meeting with President Bush on Nov. 5, the Turkish prime minister convinced the United States to convince the Kurdistan government to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK. Soon, Barzani, who had infuriated many Turks with his seemingly pro-PKK remarks, softened his rhetoric and accepted Turkey’s right to self-defense in the face of PKK terrorism. Having gained the consent of the U.S., Iraqi Kurds and even Europe, Turkey started to track the PKK terrorists within Iraqi borders, and, just last weekend, starting hitting them.
Trucks, Not Tanks
Right now, Iraqi Kurds seem to be satisfied with this “limited operation” of Turkey. But they are constantly worried about a possible widening of the Turkish focus: the all-powerful Turkish military machine, they fear, might target not just the PKK, but also their “Pesmergas,” a term which means “those who face death” in Kurdish and which refers to the armed militias of Iraqi Kurdistan. They also have concerns about collateral damage. Abdussalam Rashid, a representative of President Barzani on issues relating to Turkey, recalled an incident from 1995. Then, according to him, the Turkish Armed Forces, while carrying a massive operation against the PKK in northern Iraq, accidentally killed 7 Kurdish peasants.
Fazl Mirani, general secretary of the KDP and the “second man” in the party after Barzani, places great emphasis on the fact that Turkey and Kurdistan can be good partners and help each other prosper. “We don’t like to see Turkish tanks at our border,” he says. “We rather want to see Turkish trucks.”
Mirani’s emphasis on trucks is right on track, because Turkey indeed has a great share in the construction of Kurdistan. 65 percent of the goods in Kurdistan come from Turkey via the overflowing Habur border gate. No wonder almost all the stores there are full of Turkey’s popular brands. Moreover, 80 percent of the companies that invest in Kurdistan are of Turkish origin. With a trade volume of over 5 billion dollars, Turkey is absolutely vital for this newly emerging nation.
But might this pragmatic cooperation be undermined by nationalism on both sides? That’s a potential risk that could traumatize not just Kurdistan, but all its neighbors — including, especially, Turkey.
NEXT: The (dis)united colors of northern Iraq
The disintegration of the Ottoman empire was due in no small part to the fact that its constituent ethnicities did not feel Ottoman. Once nationalism swept through the lands, they felt the desire to establish a new identity, based on their ethnicity and religion. Ask any Greek or Armenian today how happy their ancestors were to be part of the Empire.
It is no wonder why the Turkish republic is as homogeneous as it is: save a handful of people in Istanbul, everybody left. Perhaps they felt they were getting stiffed for having to pay a tax for being part of a “protected class” (zimmi). Protection from whom? Fair or not, this tax (cizye) explicitly discriminates on the basis of religion. It alienates people; tells them they are not equal. The Turkish Republic’s constitution, as it stands, fortunately does not, but the damage is done.
Fast-forward to today and we find ourselves facing similar issues: what does it mean to be Turkish (or Ottoman, etc.)? The 1924 constitution spelled it out: anyone who respects and promises to uphold the constitution, regardless of race or religion, is a Turk. Unfortunately, this simple definition gets lost on some people because the same word is used to define the ethnicity of the majority of the country’s inhabitants. An unfortunate choice of words, in my opinion, but the intention is clear. (After all, a constitution can’t define someone’s ethnicity; that’s an immutable fact.)
I’ll go one step further and say that not only should we remind ourselves that ethnicity and religion are no hindrance to equality, we should actively celebrate our diversity. I laughed with embarrassment when I heard that Dogu Perincek (party-leader) firmly reminded Yasar Kemal (leading novelist) that he is in fact a Turk, not a Kurd. Kemal must feel enlightened now!
I’ve said too much already, but I would like to add another paragraph. The way to overcome our paranoia of “the other” bequeathed to us by the Ottomans, we need to take several steps:
1. Ensure that the law is not discriminatory and fix it if not.
2. Take the law to heart and enforce it.
3. Actively celebrate diversity rather than merely acknowledge it.
As a Turk, I worry sometimes at the level of historical awareness displayed online by some Turks (or Turkish names). Emre’s comment above exemplifies the confusion and irrationality of someone who toes the kemalist narrative. This same narrative managed to consolidate itself as the ‘official’ one in Turkey. Emre’s comment and displayed opinion, apart from being full of inaccuracies due to feeble researching, is the result of the success in implementing this 20th century founded doctrine.
Emre attempts to counter MA’s statement that Kurds were better treated under Ottoman rule by citing the dimmi system’s treatment of Greeks and Armenians. He fails to mention that in 1879 a new Ottoman constitution was drawn up abolishing this dimmi system which was by nature discriminatory. More importantly, he fails to mention that this system was irrelevant to Kurds as they are Muslims. Kurds indeed had full equal rights with Turks.
Emre stated: ‘It is no wonder why the Turkish republic is as homogeneous as it is’. This is were all sense of reality has left our felow reader’s comments. Turkey is not an homogeneous country. It is very diverse. It was far more diverse under the ottoman times but unfortunately, the government of the Young Turks in the falling years of the empire did much to cleanse this diversity in the rise of ethnic nationalism as did other nationalistic forces (greek, Armenian, arab etc…). The early years of the Republic was an era of perpetual state crimes against non-Turks but also observant Muslim Turks. In regards to Kurds, they still constitute around 20% of our population. Turkey Homogeneous???!!!!
Emre also said ‘The 1924 constitution spelled it out: anyone who respects and promises to uphold the constitution, regardless of race or religion, is a Turk. Unfortunately, this simple definition gets lost on some people because the same word is used to define the ethnicity of the majority of the country’s inhabitants’. Exactly!!! This definition was doomed to failed. It does not recognize the reality of Anatolia. Why do we Turks ask others to call themselves Turk as if we were doing them a favour or advancing them politically. This is Turkish arrogance bread by the ignorance of kemalist thought.
Emre finishes off with his guide to ‘The way to overcome our paranoia of “the other” bequeathed to us by the Ottomans. The paranoia of the other is one instilled in the post-Ottoman era. I would go as far as saying that it is in fact the collapse of the Empire which has directly led to the distrust of the other. Kemalism has poisoned Turks and turkey. The way to counter the decades of cultural and political damage caused by the kemalists, including the Kurdish problem, is to return to a more tolerant and realistic style of democracy, particular to Anatolia, which was displayed in the late 19th century by the Ottoman state.
@emre
wishful thinking…
Cenk: I expected someone to say that. Look at other countries implementing exactly the steps I have described. Why are they succeeding? Simply because they made an effort. What active steps are you or people around you taking? Or are we merely armchair critics? When people make disparaging comments about minority races and religions do you counter them or let them pass? We have to be the change we want to see.
Ceyhan: By 1879 the party was almost over. When it ended conclusively with the foundation of the Turkish Republic, all the partygoers (constituent ethnicities) had gone home and set up countries for people just like themselves (same faith). The paranoia of the other was emphatically not instilled in the Republican Era. Common sense dictates that the others would not have left or been driven out if they were not seen as “others”. How many “others” were left after 1923? Enough to constitute any kind of an internal threat, and plant the seeds of paranoia? I think not. Your logic’s causality is reversed.
If you consider a biethnic country “very diverse” then you have not seen diversity. Even those two (Turk and Kurd) are of the same religion.
Ataturk had little choice but to define the country the way he did. Correct me if I misunderstood, but I sense you wish he had said “O people of the world, come here if you subscribe to secular republican democracy. All races and creeds may apply.” The reason he placed such emphasis on nationalism was because the country was in chaos and he needed to foster unity on the double if he didn’t want to have English, French and Italian as new mother tongues. Nationalism fit the bill. Incredible progress was made in a short amount of time. That turbulent era is behind us, allowing us to re-examine our definition of citizenship. The summer 2007 draft for the new constitution proposal offers three alternatives (article 35, statement 1 of 4):
(The second alternative is the status quo. The other two decouple citizenship from ethnicity.)
I have not considered the legal ramifications separating the first from the third, but I prefer them both over the second. However, I wonder whether removing the explicit reference to freedom of religion and race may have adverse effects, even though its irrelevance may be implicitly covered by other articles. I think it is always good to spell crucial things out, at the expense of redundancy, but I am not a constitutional lawyer.
My apologies for taking the discussion off on a tangent.
Ceyhan, the 1879 constitution was honored more in the breach. In practice discrimination (and far worse) against minorities did not end. The nostalgia for a presumed tolerant Ottoman Empire must not cloud the fact that this was no liberal democracy.
From a religious point of view, Turkey today is over 99% Muslim – not exactly a model of diversity.
@Emre
I think it is not of much use to discuss the citizenship at this stage: The problem is that Turkey tries to create some sort of loyalty (by political means) to the state among its citizens by painting everyone to the very same colour and a heavily centralistic rule. But people are not happy with the current, inefficient rule over the country (be it Kurd or Turk). Firstly, get rid of the inefficient rule; and then expand the national market till it reaches to remote corners of the country and make sure that everyone benefits from the prosperity, lower the inegality between the regions and people.
Only by this way a common and shared new identity will emerge.
Turkey cannot solve its problems through merely playing with the words in the constitution.
Emre, sorry I forgot to answer your post while stating my opinion about the matter.
Well, the question is not “what we want”, but “who will make it reality and how will he do that”. I cannot see any political motivation to reform the country from top to the toe. Yeah, AKP has guts to do it; but I am afraid, they dont have the courage and most importantly, do they really want to reform the country so much that it will eventually undermine their conservative views and governance? I doubt so.
That is why I said “wishful thinking”
(Sorry for my poor english)
I agree with your assessment. Commerce will play a huge role, but money alone won’t prevent people from harboring racist feelings. Solving that takes education, and social mobility (to dispel stereotypes).
My greater point is that we should stop blaming our government for all our woes. We have the power to effect incremental change. I have been to many countries, and happen to be in the States now. People here take a great deal of responsibility for the world around them, through charities, church, and other support groups. You do not see this behavior in Turkey due to our socialist/statist tendencies. Income levels are rising so people are gradually having the opportunity think about those less fortunate than themselves.
I feel like we are walking on a tightrope to a better country. If we become more conservative we will fall off. Here’s hoping for the best…